Managing the Orange-Senqu river basin

Following my post introducing the Orange-Senqu basin and LHWP, you probably wondered what Lesotho and South Africa's bilateral arrangement means for water distribution downstream. After all, discourse surrounding the 'hydropolitics' of transboundary basins typically emphasise asymmetrical effects between upstream and downstream riparians. Also, how has the basin been managed and to what degree of success? Today's post will examine these questions further.

Basin management framework

The Orange-Senqu river basin has an established record of regional and international agreements in place. Amongst one basin-wide and six bilateral agreements, the 1986 LHWP treaty and 1992 agreement creating the region's Permanent Water Commission in particular established the foundations for joint transboundary water projects, along with institutions overseeing them (Kistin and Ashton, 2008). As part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - an intergovernmental organisation fostering political-economic cooperation amongst southern states - basin-wide water protocols were also signed in 1995 and 2000 (ibid.).

Most significantly, the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM), established against the backdrop of shifting paradigms in water management towards integrated approaches, has served as the basin's de-facto, streamlined management institution since 2000. Feeding off a favourable political climate following the SADC's formation, the ORASECOM aims to promote 'equitable and sustainable development of shared water resources'. Towards the top of its organisational structure, the council comprising an equal number of officials from each riparian state advises all parties, who establish technical task teams, with an elected secretariat also responsible for decision-making (Figure 1).

ORASECOM involves public and private sector institutions, plus local users through field projects, underpinned by a clear institutional and legal framework that is multi-sectoral and structured to permit constructive cooperation.

Figure 1: Schematic diagram illustrating the interplay and interactions between divisions of ORASECOM (Source).

Alleviating LHWP downstream miscalculations

To evaluate the efficacy of ORASECOM, it's worthwhile to delve into its role in addressing upstream-downstream asymmetries induced by the LHWP. As the Katse Dam in Lesotho - a major part of LHWP's first phase - neared completion prior to 1996, an environmental flow assessment (EFA) was commissioned following international concerns over the effects of LHWP. It found three fundamentally flawed assumptions made whilst planning the LHWP in 1970-80 that misinformed the aforementioned 1986 LHWP treaty in the Orange basin:

Table 1: Summary of miscalculated assumptions made before LHWP started construction (Adapted from Metsi Consultants, 2002).

In short, the LHWP and agreements preceding ORESECOM's conception vastly underestimated its downstream impacts on Namibia, Botswana, and more arid portions of South Africa. Whilst the former two states are known to depend much less on Orange-Senqu flows much less - thanks to smaller proportions of their populations having territorial access to perennial flows and groundwater runoff from the Molopo-Nossob system (Heyns, 2003) - this is nevertheless problematic, as cities like Gaborone in southeast Botswana continue experiencing rapid growth.

A recent basin-wide effort to account for this is the Lesotho-Botswana Water Transfer Scheme (L-BWT), of which ORASECOM is the main sponsor. Negotiated and agreed by Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa through ORASECOM, L-BWT will transfer Lesotho's plentiful water supply using a new 700km network of dams and conveyance pipelines via South Africa to downstream Botswana. In so doing, parts of central to western South Africa with unmet water needs and which will likely become more water stressed under climate change will also benefit alongside Botswana. This reflects ORASECOM's acknowledgement of the fundamental asymmetry in water endowments and power between states of the Orange-Senqu basin, working constructively off Lesotho's unparalleled 'hydro-hegemony', which is key to successful integrated management (Savanije and van der Zaag, 2008).

Figure 2: The L-BWT will stretch northwest from Lesotho into downstream Botswana, in green (Source).

All in safe hands?

So does the presence of ORASECOM mean the basin is entirely conflict- and problem-free? 

Since only agreements following its establishment are subordinate to ORASECOM, rendering it powerless over pre-established bilateral agreements and commissions, deficiencies exist. The LHWP is governed by a bilateral treaty and a separate commission, which paradoxically places Lesotho in a vulnerable position despite current supply advantages (Mirumachi, 2015): with climate change's uncertainties, Lesotho may not be able to meet the terms of its contract and continually supply predetermined quantities to South Africa - some argue that this is a form of 'hydrocolonisation' of South Africa on Lesotho. ORASECOM's capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change also remains unknown, though it is clear there is an urgent need to integrate associated adaptation measures into existing management plans (Mgquba and Majozi, 2018). 

Whilst management in the basin has been relatively effective thus far, at least on the surface, it remains to be seen how it will fare under environmental and political change.